BEFORE THE

LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: APPLICATION OF)	
ENTERGY LOUISIANA, LLC FOR)	2/4-0
RECOVERY IN RATES OF COSTS)	DOCKET NO. U- 36350
RELATED TO HURRICANE IDA)	
AND FOR RELATED RELIEF)	

DIRECT TESTIMONY

 \mathbf{OF}

MICHELLE P. BOURG

ON BEHALF OF

ENTERGY LOUISIANA, LLC

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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

- 2 Q1. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, POSITION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- 3 A. My name is Michelle P. Bourg. I am employed by Entergy Services, LLC ("ESL")1 as
- 4 Vice President, Asset Management. My business address is 639 Loyola Avenue, New
- 5 Orleans, Louisiana.

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- 7 Q2. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?
- 8 A. I am submitting this Direct Testimony on behalf of Entergy Louisiana, LLC ("ELL" or the
- 9 "Company").

- 11 Q3. PLEASE DESCRIBE BRIEFLY YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND
- 12 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.
- 13 A. I hold a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from Louisiana State University and
- subsequently earned a Master of Business Administration from Tulane University. I am a
- registered professional engineer in the state of Louisiana. In 2002, I began working for
- ESL's Transmission organization as a planning engineer in the Transmission Operational
- 17 Planning department and, in April 2006, became the department's Manager, Transmission
- Planning. In September 2009, I accepted the position of Manager, Performance
- 19 Management in ESL's Utility Operations department and, in December 2010, assumed the
- 20 position of Director, Performance Management, where I was responsible for developing,
- refining, and overseeing the performance reporting processes and benchmarking activities

ESL is a service company to the Entergy Operating Companies ("EOCs"), which are Entergy Arkansas, LLC ("EAL"); Entergy Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Mississippi, LLC ("EML"); Entergy New Orleans, LLC ("ENO"); and Entergy Texas, Inc. ("ETI").

for the Utility and Energy Delivery businesses. In 2014, I accepted the position of Director of Gas Distribution. In this capacity, I oversaw all aspects of the safe, reliable delivery of natural gas service to ENO's and ELL's natural gas customers. My specific responsibilities included, but were not limited to, safety, compliance with applicable pipeline safety regulations, operations, customer service, construction, maintenance, engineering, planning, and gas real-time system monitoring and dispatch for the Company's gas distribution system. I assumed my current role in 2019.

Q4. WHAT ARE YOUR JOB RESPONSIBILITIES?

A. In my current role, I am responsible for all aspects of the safe, efficient, and compliant field operation of ESL's transmission line and substation equipment. This includes the execution of routine transmission line and substation inspections and maintenance in accordance with ESL's procedures, the renewal and replacement of existing transmission facilities, and outage and emergency response. I am also responsible for the execution of the transmission vegetation management program, development of transmission safety programs, and skills training delivery for substation, relay protection, and line professionals.

- 19 Q5. WHAT ARE YOUR JOB RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO STORM
 20 RESTORATION?
- 21 A. I serve as the Operations Section Chief for the Entergy System. In this capacity, I am
 22 responsible for the safe and efficient restoration of transmission facilities that may
 23 experience an outage during a storm event. This includes ensuring that pre-storm activities

to prepare the transmission system for the storm event are completed in a timely fashion and proactively identifying resources (including people, materials, and equipment) that may be required for the restoration of transmission facilities. In addition, I am responsible for ensuring that ESL's objectives and strategies for completing the restoration of any transmission facilities impacted by the storm are met, including patrolling transmission facilities following passage of the storm, identifying any damage, efficiently completing any required design modifications and repairs, and returning to "normal or new normal operations" following a storm.

- 10 Q6. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS COMMISSION OR ANY
 11 OTHER REGULATORY AGENCIES?
- 12 A. Yes. A list of my prior testimony is provided in Exhibit MPB-1.

A.

II. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

A. Purpose of Testimony

16 O7. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

My testimony presents ELL's reasonable and necessary transmission-related storm costs for Hurricane Ida in the total amount of \$232.9 million that were incurred for restoration activities through March 31, 2022. As outlined in my testimony, the Company's transmission-related hurricane storm costs associated with Hurricane Ida were necessary to repair, in the most expeditious and safe manner possible, the damage sustained by the Company's transmission system and to restore services associated with electric power outages affecting the Company's customers in Louisiana. As further discussed in my

testimony, these costs were reasonable and necessary under the circumstances, and 2 processes were put in place and followed to manage, control, and verify the costs incurred. 3 I also discuss the estimated costs for certain storm-related on-going projects that have not 4 yet been completed.

> In my discussion of the transmission restoration work and costs, I describe the Entergy Transmission Organization, including its structure and function. I also discuss ELL's transmission system, along with the Company's investment, design, and maintenance of its system. Next, I address the Entergy System's storm plan and the manner in which it was implemented during the 2021 hurricane season. I then describe the damage suffered by the Company's transmission system from Hurricane Ida and the work that was undertaken to restore the system. I also discuss the resources used to restore service. Finally, I describe in detail the total transmission-related costs necessary to restore ELL's system following Hurricane Ida.

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DO YOU SPONSOR ANY EXHIBITS? O8.

Yes. My exhibits are listed in the table of contents to this testimony. 16 A.

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B. Summary of Transmission Storm Costs

- WHAT WERE THE TRANSMISSION STORM COSTS INCURRED BY ELL 19 Q9. RELATED TO HURRICANE IDA THAT YOU ARE PRESENTING IN THIS 20[°] 21 PROCEEDING?
- The transmission-related storm costs incurred as a result of Hurricane Ida that are presented 22 A. in my testimony total \$232,932,746. These dollar amounts are reflected in Exhibit MPB-23

2 and in the cost summary presented by Company witness Sarah M. Harcus as Exhibit SMH-1 to her Direct Testimony.

As I discuss below, ELL also is requesting \$22,323,088 in estimated costs associated with repairs to its Caminada 34.5 kV substation in Grand Isle, Louisiana, that was heavily damaged as a result of Hurricane Ida, and which project was not completed as of March 31, 2022. The estimated costs associated with that project will close to a distribution Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") account; therefore, they are included as distribution costs (which costs are sponsored by Company witness John W. Hawkins, Jr.). Because the Transmission organization is managing and overseeing the Caminada substation project, I discuss the details associated with the project in my testimony below.

In addition, the Company is currently constructing new river crossing structures to replace a transmission tower that was destroyed in Avondale during Hurricane Ida. The estimated costs reflected in Exhibits MPB-2 and SMH-1 do not include the cost of that project, which is ongoing.

A.

C. Summary of Restoration Challenges

Q10. WHAT SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES DID THE COMPANY ENCOUNTER IN REPAIRING DAMAGE CAUSED BY HURRICANE IDA?

The nature of the damage to the transmission system in southeast Louisiana brought unique challenges, largely based on the sheer magnitude of Hurricane Ida. The Company's transmission system in Lafourche Parish, the southern tip of which is where the storm made landfall, sustained the most damage. In addition, the storm rendered out of service all eight

Orleans area to the remainder of the Entergy transmission system and neighboring systems. However, as I discuss below, within 48 hours of the storm's exit, the Company had restored the first transmission line into the greater New Orleans area, reconnecting it to the regional grid.

Food and lodging were another challenge given the widespread damage. To overcome this challenge, ELL utilized commercial lodging where available, as well as a variety of logistics contractors to provide alternative lodging sites, both fixed and mobile.

On top of those challenges, it was necessary to implement COVID-19 safety protocols for travel, logistics, lodging, and work execution, which, in turn, resulted in increased costs associated with those safety measures, including alternative lodging, extended travel, and personal protection equipment.

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III. ELL'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM & OPERATIONS

A. Transmission Organization

Q11. HOW IS THE ENTERGY TRANSMISSION BUSINESS UNIT ORGANIZED?

The transmission systems of all EOCs, including ELL's, are planned and operated as a single integrated transmission system. The Entergy Transmission organization is responsible for the planning, operation, maintenance, and construction management of the electric transmission systems of the EOCs, including ELL. Entergy Transmission employees are employees of either ESL, which provides services in a consistent and efficient manner to all of the jurisdictional EOCs, or of one of the EOCs.

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1 WHAT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ENTERGY TRANSMISSION O12. 2 ORGANIZATION RELATIVE TO ELL? 3 A. ELL transmission personnel are responsible for local activities, which include various 4 aspects of field execution, including dispatching, maintenance, and construction. For their 5 part, ESL's transmission personnel generally provide planning, design and project 6 management services, transmission real-time operations, engineering support, safety, 7 training, environmental services, business services, regulatory and litigation support, and 8 emergency preparation for the transmission systems of all EOCs, including ELL. There is 9 no duplication of responsibilities between ELL personnel and ESL personnel. 10 11 PLEASE ELABORATE ON THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE Q13. 12 ENTERGY TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION. 13 A. Within the Entergy Transmission organization, there are five distinct functions that work 14 closely together: (1) Planning and Strategy, (2) Project Management, Construction, and 15 Engineering, (3) Operations, (4) Asset Management, and (5) Transmission Customer 16 Service. These functions are described as follows: 17 The Planning and Strategy function performs long-range transmission planning and 18 develops projects and/or operating guides necessary to ensure the EOCs' 19 transmission systems function reliably and efficiently. During storm restorations, the Planning and Strategy function plans for the restoration execution by 20

restoration plans for facilities that experienced outages during the storm.

monitoring system conditions as they change and then developing prioritized

- The Project Management, Construction, and Engineering function executes the planned capital projects. This includes managing costs and schedules and overseeing construction activities. During a storm, this function provides scouting, damage assessment, procurement and logistical support, and supports Asset Management in rebuilding facilities destroyed by the storm. In addition, the Engineering function designs replacement facilities, assists in the evaluation of replacement materials, and performs analyses of facilities that were not destroyed to ensure that they continue to meet design specifications post-storm.
 - The Operations function encompasses short-term or operational planning functions and real-time operations. During storm restoration, the Operations function monitors real-time system conditions, including the loading on lines as they are restored, ensuring that no lines become overloaded and that no voltage problems are developing. They also interface extensively with field personnel to coordinate the sequence of switching operations to restore facilities to service following the storm.
 - The Asset Management function is responsible for managing the condition of the Company's transmission line and substation assets. During normal operations, this function executes its preventative, corrective and diagnostic substation and transmission line maintenance programs, executes transmission vegetation management programs, and responds to outages and equipment problems when they arise. During a major storm restoration, this function provides personnel to perform damage assessment immediately following passage of the storm, repair and restore facilities, and supervise contractor and mutual-aid personnel.

1 Transmission Customer Service is the customer service function for transmission-2 interconnected customers such as large industrial facilities, electric cooperatives, 3 municipals, etc. During a storm, this function assists the Planning section in 4 ensuring that restoration priorities include customers interconnected to the 5 transmission system, including those not served by the EOCs, to ensure 6 prioritization is fair and equitable. 7 8 B. ELL's Transmission System 9 PLEASE **PROVIDE** GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE **ENTERGY** O14. Α 10 TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS. 11 The Entergy transmission systems span portions of five states (Arkansas, Louisiana, Α. 12 Mississippi, Texas, and Missouri) and are comprised of over 16,100 circuit miles of 13 transmission lines and approximately 1,600 substations. Employees based at various locations throughout the service area plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain the 14 15 transmission systems. 16 17 Q15. WHAT GENERAL FUNCTIONS DO THE ENTERGY TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS 18 PERFORM? The Entergy transmission systems move high-voltage, bulk electric power produced by 19 A. 20 market participants within the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. ("MISO") Regional Transmission Organization and neighboring regions across an interconnected 21 22 system of transmission lines and substations to distribution points for delivery to retail customers of the EOCs, as well as to wholesale customers such as municipalities and cooperatives, or to points of delivery into other transmission systems. The Entergy transmission systems also deliver power directly to large commercial and industrial retail customers of the EOCs. These customers include refineries, chemical plants, oil and gas processing facilities, pumping stations, and large manufacturing sites vital to the region and nation.

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Q16. WHO OWNS THE TRANSMISSION ASSETS IN THE SYSTEM?

8 A. The EOCs own the transmission system assets located in their respective service areas, as
9 well as other assets (such as computer systems) that support the operations of the
10 transmission systems.

11

12 Q17. PLEASE DESCRIBE ELL'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM SPECIFICALLY.

13 A. The ELL transmission system is comprised of over 5,400 circuit miles of transmission
14 lines. In addition to the lines, there are approximately 516 substations in the system. ELL's
15 transmission system includes transmission lines and substations operating at voltages of
16 500 kV, 345 kV, 230 kV, 138 kV, 115 kV, and 69 kV. The following table identifies ELL's
17 circuit miles of transmission line by voltage class:

18 19

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Table 1
ELL's Transmission Circuit Miles by Voltage Class

Voltage Class (kV)	Circuit Miles
500	679
345	16
230	1,428
138	701
115	1,700
69	897
TOTAL	5,421

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- The ELL transmission system is interconnected with the transmission systems of EAL,
- 3 ENO, EML, ETI, Lafayette Utilities System, Louisiana Generating LLC, Cleco Power
- 4 LLC ("Cleco"), Louisiana Electric Power Authority, Mississippi Power Company, and
- 5 Southwestern Electric Power Company.

- 7 Q18. WHY IS ELL'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM INTERCONNECTED WITH OTHER
- 8 TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS?
- 9 A. ELL's transmission system is interconnected with other transmission systems primarily to
- promote system reliability. The interconnection of transmission systems also provides
- access to other power suppliers, some of which may provide more economic sources of
- power than is available on-system.

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- 019. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE MIDCONTINENT INDEPENDENT SYSTEM
- 15 OPERATOR?
- 16 A. MISO has significant roles in planning and operating the Bulk Electric System, in addition
- to its more well-known planning and market functions. As the Reliability Coordinator for
- the portion of the Bulk Electric System that includes ELL and the other EOCs, MISO has
- the ultimate responsibility in determining what actions are necessary to safeguard the
- reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. MISO can directly or indirectly, via
- operating instructions, control the commitment and dispatch of generation, the status of
- 22 available transmission lines (opening or closing them to improve system reliability), and
- 23 the demand served by the system. This is achieved through actions such as declaring

conservative operations and imposing Maximum Generation restrictions, up to and including (as a last resort) the shedding of firm load. Hurricane Laura in 2020 was MISO's first experience with operating a system devastated by a major hurricane and the long, complex, and challenging return of the transmission system, line by line, to normal operations. While advanced drills and planning are certainly helpful in preparing for such an event, nothing can completely prepare operators for the exact challenges that will come about as the result of a powerful and damaging hurricane such as Hurricane Ida. In the spirit of continuous improvement, Entergy Operations personnel worked with MISO personnel to ensure all lessons learned from Hurricane Laura were actively reviewed and implemented, as appropriate, ahead of the 2021 storm season. For example, Entergy and MISO documented the need to conduct formal operational situational awareness calls before landfall and during any future response effort, and this process proved to be valuable during Hurricane Ida. MISO also played a key role in Hurricane Ida in coordinating with neighboring utilities that also sustained transmission system damage to ensure that all parties' systems remained reliable as they were restored.

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C. Investment, Design, and Maintenance of ELL's Transmission System

- Q20. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANY'S RECENT INVESTMENT IN AND IMPROVEMENT OF ITS TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
- Transmission capital investment can be divided into a few primary categories: (1) projects that ensure the transmission system meets North American Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC") standards for bulk electric system reliability through new lines, substations, and equipment upgrades; (2) projects that improve reliability through replacement of aging

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equipment; and (3) projects that build new facilities to reduce congestion on the system to ensure customers have access to the lowest cost power. For the period 2013-2021, the Company invested approximately \$3 billion in its transmission system. Note that 2020 and 2021 totals in Table 2 below include approximately \$385 million (2020) and \$194 million (2021) in costs associated with Hurricanes Laura, Delta, and Zeta, Winter Storm Uri, and Hurricane Ida.

Table 2.
ELL Transmission Capital Closings

Values in \$M 2017 2015 2016 2018 2019 2020 2021 Total 2013 2014 289.1 292.8 491.5 449.4 906.9 568.9 3,557.13 168.9 201.4 188.1

Source: FERC FORM No. 1

The need for this level of investment was driven by many factors, including reliability planning, load growth, infrastructure maintenance and reliability needs, economic transmission investments (*i.e.*, investments that produce cost savings to customers), and generation interconnection projects. Examples of the type of work recently performed to promote the reliability and resiliency of the Company's transmission system include:

- Updating and replacing older "legacy" lattice and wooden structures with steel mono-pole or multi-pole framings;
- Maintaining or exceeding National Electric Safety Code ("NESC") wind speed design standards, with most coastal areas being designed to withstand 140-150 mph winds; and
- Installing 30-foot to 60-foot steel caisson foundations for transmission structures located in coastal areas.

- Q21. CAN YOU PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF TRANSMISSION PROJECTS
- 2 RECENTLY COMPLETED BY THE COMPANY?
- A. Yes. The Company recently completed a transmission system upgrade in Lafourche Parish in south Louisiana that is designed to improve resiliency and reliability of the local power grid for customers in the Bayou region. The Company's transmission lines were upgraded and approximately 80 steel structures between Cut Off and Golden Meadow were replaced with infrastructure built to withstand winds of up to 150 mph. In particular, new infrastructure was placed into steel caissons to create strong foundations.

Another example is the West Monroe Reliability Improvement Project that spans across Ouachita Parish and positions the region for economic growth and increased resiliency and reliability. New transmission equipment was installed and portions of the existing, local transmission system were upgraded. Major components of the project include:

- Upgrading 4 transmission lines to 230kV,
- Construction of a new 3-mile 230kV transmission line, and
- Upgrading or expanding 5 substations.

This work made the electric system in the area more interconnected with higher capacity, which will help the Company deliver power now and into the future by way of clean generating resources like solar, for example. Also, while the project enhances service reliability, it can also help import lower-cost power to keep the region attractive to existing or new customers, including those turning to electrification to reach sustainability goals, and is an important step in the Company's modernization of the electric system in north Louisiana.

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Another recently-completed project is the Waterford - Vacherie 230 kV line 1 upgrade. This project, located in southeast Louisiana, involved upgrading the Waterford – 2 Vacherie 230 kV line to a higher rating to address future load growth and reliability needs. 3 4 WAS THE DAMAGE TO THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM FROM 5 Q22. 6 HURRICANE IDA DUE TO INADEQUATE INVESTMENT IN, OR HARDENING OF, 7 THE SYSTEM? 8 No. As I noted above, ELL has made significant investments in its transmission system A. 9 during the past several years utilizing modern design standards. The Company evaluates hardening strategies from a customer perspective, weighing the benefits of fewer and 10 11 shorter outages against the increased costs of hardening the system, which our customers ultimately must pay for. Maximizing resiliency on every aspect of the grid is not cost-12 effective for customers, but targeted programs that cost-effectively reduce the risks to 13 14 reliability posed by major storms is good for all stakeholders. In other words, ELL continually searches for ways to improve the resiliency of its transmission system while 15 16 also managing and balancing rates that are paid by customers. Furthermore, all of the Company's transmission facilities are designed and constructed to meet or exceed the 17 18 applicable design standards at the time of construction. 19 CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT YOU MEAN BY APPLICABLE DESIGN STANDARDS? 20 Q23. 21 A. Yes. Referring specifically to the transmission system in southeast Louisiana that was

impacted during Hurricane Ida, that system was designed under different sets of standards.

Older structures were designed to either the Louisiana Power & Light ("LP&L") or the

New Orleans Public Service Inc. ("NOPSI") standards that were in effect at the time of construction, which have been grandfathered into ELL's system. These standards were developed under different versions of the NESC, and, therefore, structures built under each set of standards were designed to withstand different wind loadings. Transmission facilities designed and constructed more recently utilize the unified Entergy Design Standard implemented in 1997.

Specifically, the unified Entergy Design Standard requires all transmission lines built or substantially upgraded in southeast Louisiana to be designed for at least 110 mph, with the majority being designed for 125 mph or 140 mph winds. Older transmission lines located in south Louisiana that were designed and constructed before the development of the unified Entergy Design Standard are based on legacy LP&L or NOPSI design standards. All lines, regardless of vintage, meet or exceed the NESC requirements in effect at the time of their construction.

A.

Q24. CAN YOU PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF HOW THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM FARED DURING HURRICANE IDA?

Yes. The transmission system performed well in Hurricane Ida, with more recently installed facilities that were designed and constructed under current standards largely remaining intact and requiring repairs as opposed to full scale replacement as shown in Exhibit MPB-6 to my testimony. For example, the Bayou Vista – Terrebonne 230 kV transmission line, which runs right through the heart of the Bayou region that took a direct hit from Ida's winds, sustained minimal damage. This new line was built on structures designed to withstand winds of up to 150 mph. Another example is the Valentine –

Clovelly 115 kV transmission line, which was also in the direct path of Hurricane Ida and took a direct hit from the storm, yet sustained no damage.

The eight transmission lines used to import power into the New Orleans region (the great majority of which are owned by ELL) sustained only minimal damage. Although those lines went out of service in the wake of a strong hurricane-force winds, the lines incurred damage to less than 2% of their structures and were restored to service within a few days of the storm's exit from the area as I discuss below.

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- Q25. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANY'S MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES APPLICABLE TO ITS TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
- 11 The Company utilizes several types of inspections for its transmission line structures, A. including routine aerial patrols leveraging both helicopters and Unmanned Aerial System 12 ("UAS") technology, wood pole groundline treatment and inspection, climbing inspection 13 14 (for wood poles), and comprehensive aerial inspection (for concrete and steel poles). Climbing and comprehensive aerial inspections are triggered by the performance of the 15 lines and through conditions found during routine aerial patrols, outage patrols, and 16 17 groundline inspections. As it relates to the Company's preparation for storms, the 18 Company typically completes at least one cycle of transmission aerial inspections prior to June of each year. 19

The Company flags corrective maintenance items identified through inspections that are then prioritized for remediation into the following categories:

 Priority 1 – emergency work to begin within 0-24 hours from the time work is identified;

l		• Priority 2 – urgent work to begin within 14 days from the time work is identified;
2		• Priority 3 (High) - work identified to be planned, scheduled, and work to begin
3		within 90 days from the time work is identified;
4		• Priority 3 (Medium) – work identified to be planned, scheduled, and work to begin
5		in the next calendar year; and
6		• Priority 3 (Low) – work identified to be planned, scheduled, and bundled with other
7		work.
8		
9	Q26.	WAS THE DAMAGE TO THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM FROM
10		HURRICANE IDA DUE TO INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION
11		PROGRAMS?
12	A.	No. ELL's maintenance and inspection programs are consistent with industry practices for
13		maintaining transmission systems, and the damage sustained by ELL's transmission
14		system during Hurricane Ida is not fairly attributable to any deficiencies in those programs.
15		
16	Q27.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANY'S VEGETATION PROGRAMS AND
17		PRACTICES APPLICABLE TO ITS TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
18	A.	To keep rights-of-way ("ROWs") in proper condition, the Company typically performs at
19	-	least two aerial patrols of all transmission lines each year to inspect the ROWs and identify
20	;	any areas requiring corrective maintenance. Vegetation is maintained in a manner that
21		keeps it clear from growing into the transmission lines and causing associated electrical
22		interruptions based on proximity. A combination of traditional trimming and herbicides
23		are used to maintain the ROWs, and the Company implements an inspection program to

1 identify and remove trees located outside of the Company's ROWs that may endanger the 2 conductor zone. 3 4 O28. WAS THE DAMAGE TO THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM FROM 5 HURRICANE IDA DUE TO INADEQUATE VEGETATION MANAGEMENT? 6 A. No. Our damage assessment observations during Hurricane Ida did not indicate that we 7 had inadequate vegetation management in our transmission line ROWs. To the contrary, 8 we experienced a high degree of vegetation-related damage to our facilities from trees 9 growing outside of the Company's ROWs. Through the inspection program that I noted 10 previously, the Company works to proactively mitigate high risk trees outside of our ROWs 11 with customer permission; however, obtaining customer consent to trim beyond our ROWs 12 can, at times, pose a challenge. 13 14 IV. HURRICANE IDA IMPACTS AND STORM PLAN 15 A. Description of Hurricane Ida 16 PLEASE DESCRIBE HURRICANE IDA. Q29. Hurricane Ida came ashore at 11:55 a.m. CDT on August 29, 2021, at Port Fourchon, 17 A. 18 Louisiana, as strong Category 4 hurricane impacting the region between the Atchafalaya Basin and greater New Orleans area. Ida brought with it sustained winds of 150 mph, a . 19 reported instantaneous peak wind gust of 172 mph near the coast, and winds over 135 mph 20 21 in the greater New Orleans area. The eye of the storm did not clear the Louisiana region 22 until late in the night on August 29 (or early the next morning).

Hurricane Ida is tied with several other storms for the fifth strongest hurricane to ever hit the mainland United States. By far, the most significant damage caused by the storm was in the coastal regions and the river parishes near where the hurricane made landfall and within the direct path of the eye wall, which brings the most damaging winds and intense rainfall.

The path that Ida took was directly over critical transmission corridors in the region. Sixty percent (60%) of ELL's transmission structures damaged or destroyed during Hurricane Ida occurred on 5 transmission lines, 4 of which were located in the Bayou region and 1 in the Hammond area. In addition, as I noted above, Hurricane Ida resulted in the disconnection of the greater New Orleans region from the bulk electric system with the loss of eight transmission ties into that region.

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B. Damage Caused by Hurricane Ida

- Q30. CAN YOU SUMMARIZE THE DAMAGE TO THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM SPECIFICALLY CAUSED BY HURRICANE IDA?
- 16 A. Yes. Damage to ELL's transmission system included:
 - 530 transmission structures damaged² and/or destroyed;³
 - 91 substations damaged and/or impacted; and
- 190 transmission lines out of service.

Structures are damaged by wind or wind-blown debris detaching shield wire, conductor, or damaging insulators. Contact from vegetation is also a driver of damaged structures or outages.

Structures are generally destroyed by extreme wind, the failure of a tower pulling down another tower, or, in extreme circumstances, large structures crashing into poles or towers driven by flood.

1 Q31. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT WHAT THESE DAMAGE

2 NUMBERS SHOW WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION

3 SYSTEM?

A. Yes. To put these numbers in context, the southeast Louisiana region impacted by Hurricane Ida's winds included 19 parishes representing over 2,300 miles of transmission lines and approximately 17,000 individual transmission structures. Of these roughly 17,000 structures, 250 ELL structures were destroyed, and 280 others were damaged. Newer facilities, which are designed to withstand winds of up to 150 mph, performed well in Ida. For example, following a transmission path where the storm made landfall along the coast, fewer than 1% of the newer, more resilient structures were destroyed.

What this shows is that, despite Hurricane Ida's intensity, and contrary to various erroneous media reports in the immediate aftermath of the storm relating to one ELL-owned transmission structure on the border of Avondale and Bridge City⁴ that was destroyed, the Company's transmission system withstood the storm well and was rapidly restored to service. However, the distribution system in southeast Louisiana sustained a severe amount of damage as a result of Hurricane Ida, and, within a few days after Ida struck, it was that damage to distribution facilities, not transmission facilities, that drove the timeline within which the Company was able to restore service to customers.


The transmission tower in question was located across the Mississippi River from Harahan, Louisiana, and just upstream from New Orleans.

A.

Q32. CAN YOU EXPLAIN BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF DAMAGE EXPERIENCED ON THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE IDA?

Generally speaking, the type of damage that Hurricane Ida inflicted upon the Company's transmission system included poles and towers knocked down or damaged by extreme wind loading and flying debris, conductors broken or detached from structures by falling trees or failing adjacent structures, broken arms and cross braces, and broken insulators. Substation damage included flooding of transformer and circuit breaker equipment, water and wind damage to control houses and relaying equipment, and, in the case of one coastal area substation (the Caminada 34.5 kV substation in Grand Isle), complete destruction from storm surge. The pictures below demonstrate damage resulting from Hurricane Ida's powerful winds:

Figure 1



Α.

1 Figure 2




Exhibit JWH-3 to Mr. Hawkins's testimony shows the downed vegetation throughout Hurricane Ida's path and the access issues that we faced in coastal areas. And Exhibit PRM-2, page 7, to Mr. May's testimony has additional pictures of transmission infrastructure after the storm.

Q33. WHAT IMPACT DID THE COLLAPSED TRANSMISSION TOWER IN AVONDALE HAVE ON THE COMPANY'S RESTORATION OF SERVICE TO CUSTOMERS?

None. While the single collapsing transmission tower made for sensational headlines and reports in the immediate aftermath of the storm, the transmission tower in question was not critical for transmission system security or stability. The transmission system was resilient and was restored quickly after Hurricane Ida and is still operating reliably today even though that river crossing segment is out of service while new river crossing structures are being constructed.

As I discuss below, within 48 hours of the storm's exit, the Company had restored the first transmission line into the greater New Orleans area, reconnecting it to the regional grid. And within 5 days of Ida's exit, 6 of the 8 transmission lines into the New Orleans area were returned to service, bolstering the reliability of the transmission system in the region.

Q34. HOW DOES THE DAMAGE TO THE COMPANY'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE IDA COMPARE TO PRIOR STORMS IMPACTING ELL'S SERVICE AREA?

A. With the caveat that each storm is unique, Table 3 below shows that transmission-system damage resulting from Hurricane Ida was less extensive than after earlier storms of equal or lesser intensity:

Table 3

	Katrina (Category 3 at landfall in 2005)	Rita (Category 3 at landfall in 2005)	Gustav (Category 2 at landfall in 2008)	Ike (Category 2 at landfall in 2008)	Laura (Category 4 at landfall in 2020)	Ida (Category 4 at landfall in 2021)
Transmission Structures Destroyed		664	105	566	1,459	254
Total of Transmission Structures Destroyed and Damaged (inclusive of the	Approx.	1,327	260	980	. 1,909 · _.	553
figures in the row above)						

* Values in Table 3 reflect damage to the transmission system of all affected EOCs.

The transmission-system investment that I discussed earlier in my testimony helped to prepare the system for Hurricane Ida and put the Company in the position to complete fast repairs to the system after the storm rather than lengthy and costly rebuilds.

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A.

C. The Company's Restoration Plan and Implementation

1. The Company's Transmission Incident Response Plan

Q35. PLEASE DESCRIBE ENTERGY TRANSMISSION'S PLANNING TO ADDRESS MAJOR STORMS.

Entergy Transmission maintains a thorough and comprehensive storm plan, the Transmission Incident Response Plan ("Transmission IRP"), and conducts refresher training primarily in conjunction with an annual System-level drill to test processes and abilities, which drill is discussed in more detail by Mr. Hawkins. For storm incidents, due to the close coordination necessary, Entergy Transmission also follows, and is a component of, the System Incident Response Plan ("System IRP") and the Storm Incident Specific Response Plan. In other words, Entergy's overall incident response is comprised of smaller, but well-coordinated, incident response plans at the department, business unit, state, and overall system levels. These plans, including the Transmission IRP, are updated on an ongoing basis. The Transmission IRP is accessible by all transmission employees via an internal company website.

overall incident response will interface with

the EIRT (when activated)

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- 1 Q36. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONAL 2 STRUCTURE.
 - A. The Transmission IRP and the System IRP implements an Incident Command System ("ICS") structure that assigns individuals to fill key incident preparedness and response positions, along with defining their roles and responsibilities. All business functions, including Transmission activities, are completely integrated within this command structure. The ICS structure reflected in the Transmission IRP is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

ICS Structure - Incident Response Plans All hazards approach to incident response. The Incident Commander – Incident Commander at the Entergy System level leads the overall response and coordination necessary when multiple states and/or business Chief of Staff - System functions, or a combination of the two, activate. IC Deputy - System Logistics Section Public Information Officer (PtO) - System Administration Section Chief – System Gov't Liaison Office Operations Section Chief - System Planning Section System Chief - System System Corporate Support Officer – System WebEOC Lead -System Resource Section Customer Operations Officer - System * Chief * - System State / Business Function Incident Response Incident Commander -When incident impacts multiple sites, a state or State/Business Function business function ICS response and coordination with the sites are necessary. In these cases, the response IC Deputy State/BF is led by the state or business function Incident Commander Public Administration Operations Section Chief - State/BF TBD @ Time of Incider Ptanning Section Chief - State/BF TBD @ Time of Incide Corporate apport Office Logistics Section Information Officer (PIO) -Gov't Liaison Safety Officer Chief -State/BF State/BF Site/Local cident Response Incident Commander -When incident impacts a single site within a group or function, the ICS response is led by the local site incident Commander IC Deputy -Site/Local Public Administration Section Chief -Logistics Section Operations Section Planning Section Chief - Site/Local Safety Officer: Site/Local port Office Chief - Site/Local Officer (PIO) fficer - State/B State/BF Site/Local BO @ Time of Incider State/BF BD @ Time of Incide * The Incident Commander who is leading the ** For Storm incident response, this

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role will report directly to the System

Incident Commander

The Transmission IRP includes definitions of the roles and responsibilities of the key positions in our leadership structure. Detailed contact information is included in the plan for employees and contractors.

The System Incident Commander is responsible for coordinating the response among all applicable organizations and functions, including ensuring communications with customers, as well as key governmental, regulatory, and emergency management contacts. I serve as the System Operations Section Chief and had the same responsibilities for that role during Hurricane Ida. In my storm role, I report to the System Incident Commander, who facilitates overall internal and external resource procurement and allocation among the EOCs and oversees prioritization decisions at the System level to ensure the success of the overall storm response and restoration effort.

The State Command Centers, including the Louisiana Command Center under the leadership of ELL President and CEO Phillip R. May, direct prioritization and restoration efforts within their respective EOCs.

2. Implementation of the Incident Response Plan

- Q37. DID THE COMPANY ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH ITS STORM PLAN IN PLANNING FOR, AND RESPONDING TO, HURRICANE IDA?
- Yes. Mr. Hawkins describes the Company's preparation for Hurricane Ida, and the actions taken by the Company after the storm made landfall, including the Company's efforts to ensure that enough workers were available to carry out the tasks that were necessary to restore the Company's transmission and distribution systems.